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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
'There is nothing in this section which would prevent any
court from treating the rule stated as a matter of "war-
ranty" to the user or consumer '
But in the next sentence it points out that,
'if this is done, it should be recognized and understood
that the "warranty" is a very different kind of warranty
from those usually found in the sale of goods and that
it is not subject to the various contract rules which have
grown up to surround such sales.'3
2
Because of the two earlier decisions, North Dakota appears
to be confronted with the same alternatives as was Pennsylvania
prior to their most recent decision.3,3 Earlier state cases, public
policy, and the latest trend indicate that future litigation in North
Dakota is likely to adopt the Restatement view as did Pennsylvania.
A possible criticism of the Restatement approach is that such
a holding places an unfair burden upon the manufacturer. This
approach does not place liability without fault since the plaintiff
is still required to prove a defect in the product as well as to show
a causal connection between the defect and the injury 3 Placing
a consumer, who has no adequate means of protecting himself, in
a position of uncertain recovery for injuries resulting from defective
products is a more dangerous proposition. A supplier should not
be permitted to avoid responsibility by saying that he has made
no contract with the consumer. Liability ought to be placed at the
source of the defect. That end can best be accomplished through
the adoption of the view recommended by the Restatement of
Torts (Second)
RONALD K. CARPENTER
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY TO TRESPASSING CHILDREN-The
plaintiff, a twelve-year-old boy, suffered personal injuries while
climbing on and jumping from a scaffold erected by the defendants
in connection with the construction of a new home. The district
court denied defendants' motion for a judgment notwithstanding
verdict. The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that under the
32. Stromsodt v. Parke-Davis & Co., supra note 28 at 997, quoted from 2 FRuMm-
FRrEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, Chap. 3, § 16A (4).
33. Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853 (Pa. 1966).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS, § 402A (1964).
RECENT CASES
facts of the case, considered in the light of the principles of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, there were no factual questions
for the jury to determine and reversed the order denying defend-
ants' motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict. Mikkelson v
Risovt, 141 N.W.2d 150 (N.D. 1966)
This case is one of first impression in this jurisdiction. It marks
the acceptance of the principles set forth in Section 339, Restatement
(Second) of the Law, Torts,' as the determinants in establishing
whether or not a possessor of land is liable for physical harm to
children trespassing thereon.
The earliest acknowledgment of the special status of the child
trespasser is found in the Sioux City & P.R.R. v Stout2 and has
since been variously recognized as the "turntable doctrine," "infant
trespasser doctrine," "attractive nuisance doctrine," and "play-
ground doctrine." Each characterization carried its own unique
criteria for establishing the landowner's or possessor's duty and
liability toward the trespassing child.4
While the North Dakota Supreme Court in the instant case
expressed the opinion that previous North Dakota cases were in
no way contrary to its present position, Dean Prosser saw in one
of those prior cases, O'Leary v Brooks Elevator Co., 5 the ap-
parent requirement that the child be induced to trespass.6 If, then,
there ever was any need for allurement or attraction in order
to find liability in this jurisdiction, such is clearly no longer the case.
It should be noted that this particular section of the Restate-
ment (Second) is not concerned with the activities of the possessor;7
is not limited to "young children" or those of "tender years;" 8
does not impose a duty upon the possessor to investigate or inspect
his land to discover a condition which may be harmful; and, unless
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS, § 339 (1965) "A possessor of land is subject to
liability for physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by an artificial con-
dition upon the land if (a) the place where the condition exists Is one upon which the
possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and (b) the
condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know and which he realizes
or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to
such children, and (c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition
or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area made
dangerous by it, and (d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the
burden of eliminating the danger is slight as compared with the rsk to children involved,
and (e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or other-
wise to protect the children."
2. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873).
3. See Generally, Prosser, Trsespasssng Children, 47 CALiF. L. REV. 427 (1959), 20
VAND. L. REV. 139 (1966).
4. Ibid.
5. 7 N.D. 554, 75 N.W 919 (1898).
6. Prosser, supra note 3, at 448.
7. As to liability to children for such activities see RESTATZMENT (SECOND), ToaTS,
§3 333, 334, 336 (19,65).
8. E.g., Boyer v. Guidlcy, 246 S.W.2d 742 (Mo. 1952) (seventeen-year-old boy injured
by dynamite cap).
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he knows of the condition, imposes no liability 9 It does impose
liability even though the structure or artificial condition was
created and maintained by some third person so long as the pos-
sessor has knowledge of it. 10
Whether the child appreciates the risk or hazard involved is
generally considered to be a subjective matter The question is not
what the possessor may expect of the child trespasser, but what
the child in fact understands.- This being the case, it follows that
once the child's ignorance of the risk is established any issue of
contributory negligence is irrelevant. 12
Liability ordinarily will not attach to conditions of height,
fire and water in the absence of some other factor creating a special
hazard not readily apparent to the child traspasser. Among the
special factors that may cause liability to be incurred, even as to
these common hazards, are such things as a hidden condition, a
distracting influence, or the extreme youth of known trespassers.' s
The court may hold the child to knowledge and appreciation of an
obvious risk even though the complaint alleged lack of such
knowledge. 4
Attractive nuisance cases undoubtedly require the exercise of
extreme discretion on the part of the judge as to whether or not
the allegations and facts are sufficient to take the case into the
province of the jury The sympathy provoking nature of an injured
child is no minor factor.15 Courts which follow the functional deline-
ation1 suggested by the Restatement (Second) achieve results
more in keeping with the purposes of section 339 of Restatement
(Second) 17 It must be remembered that under section 339 five
facts must be found before the possessor incurs a duty toward the
trespassing child. If reasonable minds might not differ on any one
9. Prosser, supra note 3, at 451.
10. Smith v. Otto Henderson Post 212, American Legion, 241 Minn. 46, 62 N.W.2d 354
(1934).
11. Prosser, supra note 3, at 461.
12. Larnel Builders, Inc. V. Martin, 110 So.2d 649 (Fla. App. 1959).
13. Prosser, upra note 3, at 456-61.
14. Schilz v. Walter Kassuba, Inc., 27 Wis.2d 390, 134 N.W.2d 453, 457 (1965).
15. See Johnson v. Clement F Scully Construction Co., 255 Minn. 41, 95 N.W.2d 409
(1959).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS, § 328B (1965) "In an action for negligence the
court determines (a) whether the evidence as to the facts makes an issue upon which
the jury may reasonably find the existence or non-existence of such facts; (b) whether
such facts give rise to any legal duty on the part of the defendant; (c) the standard of
conduct required of the defendant by his legal duty; (d) whether the defendant has con-
formed to that standard, in any case In which the jury may not reasonably come to a
different conclusion (e) the applicability of any rules of law determining whether the
defendant's conduct is a legal cause of harm to the plaintiff; and (f) whether the harm
claimed to be suffered by the plaintiff is legally compensable."
17. See O'Keefe v. South End Rowing Club, 51 CaI.Rptr. 534, 414 P.2d. 830 (1966)
Walker v. Sprinkle, 267 N.C. 626, 148 S.E.2d 631 (1966), Jesko v. Turk, 421 Pa. 434, 219
A.2d. 591 (1966).
RECENT CASES
of the five facts and such is adduced in favor of the defendant,
a directed verdict for the defendant should follow irrespective of
any other consideration.18
The supreme court in the instant case has applied the Restate-
ment (Second) as the better reasoned cases would have it applied;
under this application, the resulting liability is only negligence
liability; the defendant is not liable if he has used all reasonable
care under the circumstances.
PATRICK W FISHER
18. Klaus v. Eden, 70 N.M. 371, 374 P.2d. 129, 132 (1962).
